Denver Journal of International Law & Policy
Volume 2
Number 2 Fall

Article 5

January 1972

The Nineteenth Century Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and the
Importance of the Growth of State Trading
Clive M. Schmitthoff
Frank Wooldridge

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/djilp

Recommended Citation
Clive M. Schmitthoff & Frank Wooldridge, The Nineteenth Century Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and the
Importance of the Growth of State Trading, 2 Denv. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 199 (1972).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Denver Sturm College of Law at Digital
Commons @ DU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Denver Journal of International Law & Policy by an
authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,digcommons@du.edu.

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY
DOCTRINE OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE
IMPORTANCE OF THE GROWTH OF

STATE TRADING
CLIVE M. SCHMITOFF*
FRANK WOOLDRIDGE*

*

It is well known that the principle of sovereign immunity
finds no support in classical international law.1 It is not referred
to by Grotius, is deprecated by Bynokershoek, and Vatte 2 is
only prepared to admit it with regard to the person of the sovereign. The historical origin of the doctrine is bound up with
the personal immunity of heads of state, and it was with regard
to this that the distinction between acts juri imperii and jure
gestionis first attained prominence in Germany in the eighteenth
3
century.
The evolution of the doctrine of sovereign immunity is thus
comparatively recent and it was not until the nineteenth century that the doctrine could have been said to be established in
a majority of states. 4 In the Anglo-Saxon countries the growth
of the doctrine of sovereign immunity has been influenced by
the immunity of the local sovereign. In the United States, a
further influence appears to have been the Constitution. 5 The
classic formulation of the doctrine of sovereign immunity was
set forth by Marshall, C.J. in the case of The Schooner Exchange
0
The most relevant paragraph of his judgment apv. M'Faddon.
pears to be as follows:
*Clive M. Schmitthoff, LL.M., LL.D. (London), Dr. jur. (Berlin), Barrister, Visiting Professor of International Business Law at the City
University and at the University of Kent at Canterbury, Hon. Professor
of Law at the Ruhr-Universitat Bochum. ( 1972 Clive M. Schmitthoff.
* Frank Wooldridge, LL.B., LL.M., Ph.D. (Law), Lecturer in Law at the
University of Kent at Canterbury.
1 See Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional Immunities of Foreign
States, 28 BAIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 220, 223 (1951).
2
Vatel, however, recognized the principle of independence, sovereignty
and equality of states. IIE. VATTEL, LE Daorr DES GENS (1758). It seems
Marshall, C.J. derived the doctrine from the writings of Vattel. Id. at
ch. III, § 36, and ch. VIII, §§ 78, 79, 81.
3 For the history of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, see E. GMUR,
GERIcHTSHARKEIT UBER FREMDEN STAATEN (1948).
4 S. SUCHARITKUL STATE IMMUNITIES AND TRADING AcTIvrIEs IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 4 (1959).

5 See Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934).
6 The Schooner Exchange v. M'Faddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).
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This full and absolute territorial jurisdiction being alike the
attribute of every sovereign, and being capable of conferring
extra-territorial powers, would not seem to contemplate foreign
sovereigns nor their sovereign rights as its objects. One sovereign being in no respect amenable to another and being
bound by obligations of the highest character not to degrade
the dignity of the nation, by placing himself or its sovereign
rights within the jurisdiction of another, can be supposed to
enter a foreign territory only under an express license, or in
the confidence that the immunities belonging to his independent
sovereign station, though not expressly stipulated, are reserved
by implication and will be extended to him.7
It seems that the Courts of most countries, apart from
Holland and Scandinavia, recognized the doctrine of sovereign
immunity in the nineteenth century. By that time, it had become
a generally accepted principle of international customary law,
and is the basis for the doctrine in Hackworth's Digest of International Law.8 While some would argue that the doctrine
of absolute immunity still prevails in international law," it may
be doubted that all states applied it to commercial transactions,
even in the nineteenth century." That was the era in which
state trading functions were generally minimal, and in which
the principle of laissez-faire was generally in vogue. It lasted
until the coming of the economic depression in the last quarter
of the century."
Although the volume of state trading increased in the twentieth century, 12 this increase has not always been reflected in
judicial decisions by a modification of the doctrine of absolute
state immunity. The problem of state trading has sometimes
been dealt with by treaties. In a 1948 treaty between the
United States and Italy, 13 both states agreed not to raise the
issue of sovereign immunity with respect to any "enterprise
of either High Contracting Party which is publicly owned and
controlled, and engages in commercial manufacturing, processing, supplying or other business activities within the territories
7In another part of his judgment, Marshall, C.J. expressed the opinion
that the above principles do not apply to state trading. One may
usefully compare the above doctrine of Marshall, C.J. with that of
Lord Atkin in The Cristina, [1938] A.C. 485, in which the learned Law
Lord expressed the opinion that to implead a foreign sovereign would
be to act contrary to a rule of international law.
8 G. HACKWORTH, 2 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 393 (1963).
9 See Fitzmaurice, State Immunity from Proceedings in Foreign Courts,

14 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 101-124 (1933).
10 See Gutteriez v. Elmelit, [1886] FoRo ITAL. I 913.
11 As is well known, the doctrines of the Fabians and of the Oxford

Hegelians then suggested a larger role for the State.

12This increase may be direct, or through a state controlled corporation,

as with the U.S.S.R. and other socialist countries.
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of the other High Contracting Party." There has also been a
shift in the position of national courts concerning the doctrine
of sovereign immunity in regard to increased state trading. It
seems that only the United Kingdom, India,' 4 the Soviet Union
and some Eastern European countries now favor the absolute
rule of sovereign immunity."" The writings of publicists, as
well as the practice of states, have led many to concur with
Professor O'Connell I G that there is no international law regarding sovereign immunity, or, that if there is, it only covers a
narrow field.
The Three Theories Regarding Sovereign Immunity
1. The Absolute Theory
According to this theory, the plea of immunity is available
in all cases in which the person or property of a foreign sovereign is impleaded in the courts of another sovereign. The fact
that it is the sovereign's person or property gives rise to this
immunity notwithstanding the nature of the act of the foreign
sovereign. As will be noted later, British courts adopt this view
although it is open to the House of Lords to adopt a different one.
2.

The Theory of Limited Immunity

This theory provides that the foreign sovereign may arrest
suit or prevent execution only where the activity involved is
that of the government. Immunity thus covers acts jure imperii,
but not jure gestionis. Some would argue that the former are
distinguished from the latter as a result of their objects, while
others would argue, following Weiss, that the juridical nature of the transaction is decisive,'1 7 and that if the transaction
18
could be entered into by an individual, it is one jure gestionis.
13 See Schmitthoff, The Claim of Sovereign Immunity in the Law of
International Trade, 7 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 452-53 (1958).

14 See Dulerai and Co. v. Pokerdas Mengraj, 39 ALL INDIA RPTR. 335

(1952); In re Commissioner for Workers' Compensation, 38 ALL INDIA

RPTR. 880 (1951).

15 The U.S. Supreme Court abandoned the doctrine of absolute immunity
in the case of Republic cf Mexico v. Hoffmann, 324 U.S. 30 (1945),
before the issue of the Tate Letter by the State Department in 1952.
16D. O'Connell, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW 918 (1965); see also I. BROWNLIE,

PRINCIPLES

SORENSEN,

OF

MANUAL

PUBLIC

INTERNATIONAL

OF PUBLIC

LAW

282 (1966) and M.
426 (1963).

INTERNATIONAL LAW

17 Compdtetence ou I'incomp6tence d I' egard des~tats 6trangers, Hague
Academy of International Law, Recueil des Cours, (1923). The distinc-

tion between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis finds apparent
expression in the provisions of the CONVENTION ON THE TERRITORIAL SEA
AND THE CONTINGUOUS

ZONE,

1958, 516 U.N.T.S. 205;

CONVENTION

ON

THE HIGH SEAS, 1958, 450 U.N.T.S. 825.
18 The Austrian Supreme Court case of Dralle v. Republic of Czechoslovakia, I.L.R., 1950, Case No. 41, treats the distinction between acts
jure imperii and jure gestionis as one accepted by international law.
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The distinction between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis0
is difficult to make especially if the first argument is adopted.
There is, according to the U.S. Supreme Court case of The
Pesaro, "no international usage which regards the maintenance
and advancement of the economic welfare of a people in time
of peace as any less a public purpose than the maintenance and
'20
training of a natural force.
3. The Theory Which Denies the Existence of Sovereign Immunity
Sir Hersch Lauterpacht argued that the doctrine of sovereign immunity has no sound basis in international law. 21 He
contends that absolute immunity has largely been abandoned in
state practice because criteria for so limiting immunity are not
uniform and have become unworkable. He suggests that foreign
States should be submitted to the jurisdiction in the same way,
and to the same extent, as is the sovereign. 22 He qualifies this
statement with four specific rules which he thinks should be
universally adopted; (a) that executive acts of the foreign sovereign in his own territory should enjoy immunity; (b) that
legislative acts should likewise enjoy immunity; (c) that governmental contracts should be treated according to the private
international law rule of the lex fori, which may provide that
there is no jurisdiction; and, (d) that traditional diplomatic
immunities in regard to warships and other foreign property
should be preserved.
23
In his judgment in Rahimtoola v. Nazim of Hyderabad,
Lord Denning agreed in principle with Lauterpacht's exceptions.
He said:
If the dispute brings into question, for instance, the legislative
or international transactions of a foreign government, or the
policy of its executive, the court should grant immunity if
asked to do so, because it does offend the dignity of a foreign
sovereign to have the merits of such a dispute canvassed in
the domestic courts of another country; but if the dispute concerns, for instance, the commercial transactions of a foreign
government (whether carried out by its own departments or
agencies or by setting up separate legal entities), and it arises
Which distinction has not applied in English Law. But see the cases
cited by Mann, Law Governing State Contracts, 21 BRrr. Y.B. INT'L L.
(1944).
20 277 F. 473 (1921).
21 Lauterpacht, supra note 1, at 226-36. See also Schmitthoff, supra, note
13, at 452.
22As O'Connell correctly points out, supra note 16, at 919, this would be
capable of being interpreted as, where the sovereign of the forum
submits himself to the jurisdiction only in matters Jure gestionis the
problem of distinguishing these from acts juri imperii is not avoided.
23 Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad [1957] 3 W.L.R. 884.
"9
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properly within the territorial jurisdiction of our courts, there
24
is no ground for granting immunity.

It is difficult to support the doctrine of absolute immunity
under modern conditions. It is doubtful whether the dignity of
the sovereign State is a suitable basis for the doctrine, since
the courts of most States now adhere to the doctrine of limited
immunity. Article 11 of the Draft Convention Respecting the
Competence of Courts in Regard to Foreign States prepared
by the Harvard Law School in 1932 suggested the adoption 'of
this doctrine. As was stated in an earlier article,25 the test which
provides a workable distinction between acts jure imperii and
jure gestionis turns on the nature of the transaction. The third
theory of Judge Lauterpacht would seem to lead to a similar
conclusion, given that the distinction between public and private
26
acts depends upon the nature of the transaction.
One must surely agree with Sucharitkul that ". . . the only
hopeful approach to the problem of jurisdictional immunities
of States in regard to trading activities appears to be to assimilate as far as possible the position of foreign State traders to
that of private merchants or ordinary foreigners and foreign
corporations. ' 27 He also believes that there is room for modification of the doctrine outside the sphere of trading activities,
and a need for a broad definition of the concept of "trading
activities. ' 28 The doctrine of sovereign immunity should be
abolished in this area in relation to process, attachment, and
execution.
The Treatment of the Plea of Sovereign Immunity in Commercial
Transactions by National Courts
It is not finally settled in the United Kingdom whether a
foreign sovereign, acting directly or through the medium of
a state trading corporation, can claim immunity. The question
25
however,
has not yet arisen directly in the House of Lords,
-24 See id. at 913.
25 Schmitthoff, supra note 13, at 456.
2G Note that, as Judge Lauterpacht points out, it may be argued that
some contracts can only be made by a state, i.e., the purchase of
provisicns for the services.
27 S. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 4, at 313-14.
28 Note that the activities exercised by the New Brunswick Corporation
as described by the judges in Mellenger v. New Brunswick Corporation, [1971] 1 W.L.R. 604 were perhaps not trading, but for the promotion of the industrial development of the province. The decision,
nevertheless, appears to be unsatisfactory.
29 It seems clear that English law has net committed itself to the position of granting immunity to state trading vessels, and in view of
the general development in favour of restrictive immunity, it seems
unlikely that it will. The opinions of Lord Maugham, Thankerton and
Macmillan in The Cristina,[1938] A.C. 485 were in favour of limited irn-
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Lord Denning expressed that he was in favor of the denial of
°
the principle of immunity in Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad
as mentioned above. It may be that if the question were now
to arise in the House of Lords, their Lordships might decide
in favor of the limited principle of immunity, or even in favor
of the denial of the principle altogether with exceptions as
already enumerated. There is nothing, it would seem, in international customary law which need dissuade them from so
doing. Furthermore, the Court of Appeal has decided in favor
of absolute immunity 1 Its decisions relevant to state trading
corporations will be considered in the next section of this article.
It is clearly open to parliament to legislate on the question of
sovereign immunity, and restricting it, at least as far as trading
transactions are concerned, would not be contrary to international law.
In the United States, one must distinguish between the
judicial and the administrative views of sovereign immunity in
commercial transactions. The "Tate Letter"3 2 was the culmination of a policy which had been pursued by the State Department for many years. In this statement a survey of the practice
regarding immunity in various countries was made, and it concluded that only English and Soviet law recognized the doctrine
of absolute immunity. Other countries tended toward the restrictive rule which distinguishes acta gestionis from acta
imperii. The letter indicated the intention of the Department
of State to follow the restrictive view of soverign immunity.
In concluding certain commercial treaties 33 with other countries,
the United States has expressly provided that state owned or
controlled enterprises of these countries shall not be entitled to
sovereign immunity when engaged in business activities in the
territory of the other.
State Department certification has much directive impor-

munity, as was the decision of the Irish Supreme Court in The Ramava,
[1941] 75 IR. L.T.R. 153 and the Canadian decision of Flota Maritma
Browning de Cuba S.A. v. SS. Canadian Conquerer, [1962] 30 D.L.R. 2d
172 (Can.). See D. O'CONNELL, supra note 16, at 943.
30 Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 884, 913.
31 The Parlement Belge, (1880), 5 P.D. 197; The Porto Alexandre, (1920),
23 P.D. 30, Krajina v. Tas Agency [1949] 2 ALL E.R. 274; Baccus S.R.L.
v. Servicio Nacional Del Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438; Mellenger v. New
Brunswick Development Corp., [1971] 1 W.L.R. 604.
32 26 DEPT. STATE BULL 984 (1952).
33

See Schmitthoff, supra note 13, at 452-53.
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tance in the U.S. courts 4 In The Republic of Mexico v. Hoffmann,3. 5 the State Department refrained from certifying that it
recognized Mexican ownership, without possession of a ship, as
a ground of immunity. The Supreme Court held that the vessel
was not immune from jurisdiction, because the vessel was not
in possession of the Mexican government. In his concurring
opinion, Frankfurter stated that the concept of possession was
a tenuous one for the purpose of distinguishing between vessels which are entitled to immunity and those which are not,
and that the decision of the court constituted the overruling
of earlier decisions. In National City Bank of New York v.
Republic of China,30 the Supreme Court's deferral to the Tate
Letter may be described as the basis of the decision. The State
Department seems to now recognize sovereign immunity on a
case by case basis.
Despite the doubts of Hamson, 37 France also adheres to the
restrictive theory distinguishing actes de commerce or actes de
gestion prive6s and actes de puissance publique. In Roumania -v.
Pascalet,38 the Commercial Tribunal of Marseilles decided that
the purchase of goods for resale to nationals was an acte de
commerce for which immunity would not be granted. Also, in
Chaliapinev. Representation Commerciale de I'U.R.S.S. et socidt6
Brenner,39 the Soviet Union was not granted immunity in a
suit for breach of copyright in the publication and sale of books.
These cases concerning state trading instrumentalities show the
40
general reluctance of French courts to grant immunity.
At the beginning of this century, German courts firmly
supported the absolute theory of sovereign immunity. In 1921,
chis concept was applied to the Ice King Case, 41 in which the
court disclaimed jurisdiction in a shipping case involving a for34 Note that in Chemical Natural Resources v. Republic of Venezuela,
(1966), 42 I.L.R. 119, a case heard in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, prohibiticn was granted requiring the lower court judges to
accept the State Department's suggestion of sovereign immunity, which
was said to be binding on a U.S. court even though it related to a
foreign government's commercial transactions.
35 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
36National City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955).
37 See Hamson, Immunity of foreign states: the practice of the French
courts, 27 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 293 (1950). See also Lauterpacht's criticism of the article, supra note 1, at 262-63 n.9.
38 Roumania v. Pascalet, A.D. 1923-4, Case No. 68.
39Chaliapine v. Representation Commerciale de l'U.R.S.S. et soci~t6
Brenner, Dallos P~riodique 1934-2/139.
401t
seems that French judges, unlike their British counterparts, are
willing to impose and apply their own views of governmental acts,
and are predisposed to deny immunity in cases invclving the Soviet
Union, which has made a state monopoly of its foreign trade.
41 Gustaf Selling v. United States Shipping Board, (1922), 103 R.G.Z. 274.
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eign sovereign. However, German courts have recently shown a
tendency to adopt the restrictive theory.42 In contrast, Italian
courts have denied immunity since before the turn of the century. This denial of immunity has been based upon a doctrine
of implied waiver. Italian law seems to have developed the most
restrictive principle of sovereign immunity and, since it is
easy to imply a waiver of jurisdictions, 43 the courts take a
liberal view as to what constitutes acta gestionis.44 The Italian
45
Supreme Court, in the case of State de Rumania v. Trutta,
applied the "nature of the transaction" test to a contract for
the supply of leather to a foreign army. It thus decided that
immunity would not be granted since the purpose of the transaction could not alter the private nature of the act of entering
into a contract. Belgian and Swiss courts also adhere to the
46
doctrine of restrictive immunity.
A growing number of states also admit the execution of
judgments upon state assets which do not serve public purposes.
Swiss law permits execution subject to authorization from the
Federal Council; and in the Socobel case,41 a Belgian court subjected Greek assets in Belgian banks to execution. The French
decisions regarding executions are in conflict; but in the United
States, execution has been allowed against a foreign State's
property.
Sovereign Immunity and State Trading Corporations
It is necessary to refer to three English Court of Appeal
decisions 48 before discussing the legal position in the United
States, France, Germany, and Italy. The decisions, in at least
the second of these cases and perhaps the third, are unfortunate.
SUcHARITKUL, supra note 4, at 222-25.
Compare the English case of Baccus S.R.L. v. Servico Nacionale del
Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438 C.A. and Kahan v. Federation of Pakistan
[1951] 2 K.B. 1003.
In the case Hungarian Papal Institute v. Hungarian Institute (Academy) in Rome, (1960) 40 I.L.R., 59, the Italian Court of Cassation
decided that the Hungarian Academy was exempt from the jurisdiction of the Italian courts, as it was an organ of the Hungarian State,
performing cultural activities of a public kind according to an international agreement. This body was not engaging in trading activities.

42 S.
43

44

45 State de Rumania v. Trutta, [1926] FoRo

ITAL.

I. 584.

46Austria recognizes the doctrine of limited sovereign immunity. See, e.g.,
the Supreme Court case (Collision with foreign government-owned

motor car (Austria) case), Feb. 10, 1961, 40 I.L.R. 73.
47 Socobel v. Greek State, 32 I.L.R. 187, 1951, Case No. 2.
48 See Schmitthoff, supra note 13, at 463-67; see also Wedderburn, Sovereign Immunity of Foreign Public Corporations, INr'L & COMP. L.Q.
290 (1957). The cases are Krajina v. Tass Agency, [1949] 2 ALL E.R.
274; Baccus S.R.L. v. Servicio Nacional del Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438,
and Mellenger v. New Brunswick Development Corporation, [1971] 1
WJL.R. 604.
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In Krajina v. Tass Agency, the plaintiff alleged he had been
libeled in the Tass Agency, a newspaper published and registered
under the U.K. Registration of Business Names Act of 1916.
Suit was initiated for damages in the English courts. The defendant entered a conditional appearance and applied to the
court to have the suit set aside on the ground that it was a
department of the Soviet State and, therefore, immune from
suit. They produced a certificate from the Soviet Ambassador
stating that Tass "constitutes a department of the Soviet State,
' 49
The
i.e., the U.S.S.R., exercising the rights of a legal entity.
writ was set aside by Birkett, J., and his order was affirmed
by the Court of Appeal. Cohen, L.J. and Tucker, L.J. added
that the agency has the status of a governmental department
and that even if it could have been proved that Tass was incorporated as a legal entity, it would not have been deprived
of sovereign immunity. Singleton, L.J., in a brief but interesting
opinion, stated that if it had been possible to show that Tass
Agency was incorporated as a separate legal entity, the position might have been different. An important factor in the case
may have been that the activities engaged in by the Tass
Agency are of a propagandist and political nature having little
commercial purpose.
The Baccus case was a more unfortunate decision. It concerned a Spanish corporation, the Servicio Nacional del Trigo.
On one hand, the corporation was held to be a separate legal
entity, and on the other, it was held to be a department of the
Spanish government and acting in conformity with the instructions of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture. Servicio entered
into two C.I.F. contracts for the sale of 26,000 tons of rye to a
private Italian company. The contracts provided that "any divergence which may arise . . .both parties submit to the jurisdiction of the technical courts of London." Dispute did arise, and
the plaintiffs issued a writ out of the jurisdiction claiming
damages for breach of contract. Servicio entered an unconditional appearance and the plaintiff buyers filed their statement
of claim. One year after its apparent submission to the jurisdiction, Servicio pleaded immunity on the ground that it was a
department of the Spanish government. It filed an affidavit to
that effect, stating that the earlier procedural steps had been
taken by a Spanish official who purported to act for Servicio,

49

Krajina v. Tass Agency, [1949] 2 ALL E.R. 274, 284.
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but who did not have authority.50 The Court of Appeal upheld
this belated plea of sovereign immunity by a vote of two to
one. Singleton, L.J., dissenting, elaborated the rationale which
51
he had already outlined in the Tass Agency case. It is unfortunate that the Court of Appeal did not decide that when
a separate legal entity is set up by a state for trading purposes,
that entity should not enjoy the benefits of sovereign immunity.
It is arguable, as Professor Wedderburn has contended, that
despite the Baccus case, where the evidence may perhaps have
been special, 52 it is still possible for an English court to decide
that a foreign state trading corporation is sufficiently independent to not be an agent of the State, and, therefore, not
subject to the doctrine of sovereign immunity. It is no longer
allowable for the Court of Appeal to state that mere incorporation and having a commercial function suffices to grant this
degree of independence.
It would seem, then, that the Mellenger case was rightly
53
decided if the test of commercial functions is adopted, but
wrongly decided if the wide principle of Judge Lauterpacht's
denying sovereign immunity is adopted. In this case two industrial consultants, who intended to bring action against the
New Brunswick Development Corporation, applied for leave to
issue a writ and to serve notice of it on the corporation outside the jurisdiction. They alleged that a two hundred thousand
pound commission was owed to them for effecting a business
introduction leading to the establishment of a chipboard plant in
New Brunswick. The Canadian corporation entered a conditional appearance opposing the application stating that the
convenient forum for the trial was New Brunswick. Kilmer
Brown, J., granted the plaintiff's request and gave the corporation leave to appeal from his order. It should be noted that the
corporation was established under the New Brunswick Act of
50It does, in fact, seem Senor Cavero, a senior civil servant who had
instructed that unconditional appearance be entered, did not know
the effect of entering an appearance. See Parker, L.J., speech in
Baccus S.R.L. v. Servicio National del Trigo, [1957] 1 Q.B. 438, 473.
51 The learned Judge, like Cohen, L.J. in Krajina's Case, referred to a

number of American cases, in particular Ulen and Co. v. Polish Na-

52

tional Economic Bank, infra.
See Lord Denning's explanation of the decision on this ground in
Mellenger [1971] 1 W.L.R. 610. It seems that, although according to
the affidavit of Snr. Jose Colas, the corporation was subject to the
control and supervision of the Spanish Ministry of Agriculture, the
corporation was able to effectively exercise the functions of an autonomous body. Perhaps the Master of the Rolls sought to limit the
effect of the case drastically in his obiter dictum distinguishing it

on its facts. He also stated he was not sure it could be upheld.

53 These functions were adopted by Lord Denning.
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1959, which states, "There is hereby constituted on behalf of
Her Majesty in right of New Brunswick a body corporate under
the name of the New Brunswick Development Corporation. .. ."
It is clear that this corporation is closely connected with
the government. The Minister of Industry is an ex-officio director, and the other directors are appointed by the Lieutenant
Governor. The corporation has no issued capital, and no stocks
or shares. Its principal power under Section 3(1) (a) of the Act
is to "assert, promote, encourage and advance the industrial
development, prospects and economic welfare of the province,"
and, although the corporation has the power, with the consent
of the Lieutenant Governor in Council, to carry on any business
of an industrial, commercial or agricultural nature, it has never
exercised that power.
It was arguable that the contract entered into was not a
trading one, because it did not involve buying or selling, but
it did involve the introduction of Airscrew Weyrac in New
Brunswick instead of in Sweden or Finland. Also, it was apparent that the New Brunswick corporation was closely identified with the New Brunswick government, and that it had
never pursued ordinary trade or commerce. On these grounds,
Lord Denning, M.R., and Salmon, L.J., with Phillimore, L.J.
concurring, decided that the corporation was entitled to sovereign immunity. The reason for the decision was that the
New Brunswick Development Corporation was not carrying on
5 4
any commercial transactions.
Arguably, however, the purchase of information is a commercial transaction, and certainly an ordinary contract was in
question. In Rahimtoola's case,5 5 Lord Denning used the example of the commercial transactions of a foreign state as an
instance of when sovereign immunity should not be granted.
The Mellenger case was not concerned with the legislation of
international transactions by a government, and with due respect it seems that Lord Denning did not follow the logical conclusions which he might have derived from his judgment in
Rahimtoola's case. Had Judge Lauterpacht's view of sovereign
immunity been adopted, or the method of Judge Weiss for distinguishing between acts jure imperii and jure gestionis, the

54 See Mellenger v. New Brunswick Development Corp., [1971], 1 W.L.R.
55

609.

Rahimtoola v. Nizam of Hyderabad, [1957] 3 W.L.R. 884-913.
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case would have been decided differently. In the opinion of the
writers it should have been. 56
In the United States a distinction has been drawn between
government departments and corporations. U.S. courts have
been consistent in their denial of immunity to private corporations. In 1824, Marshall, C.J. 57 said that a government divests
itself of its sovereign character when it becomes a partner in
a trading corporation, and so far as trading transactions, takes
on the character of a private citizen.58
Ulen and Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego (National
Economy Bank)5 9 was concerned with a foreign bank in which
the majority of the shares were owned by the Polish government, with control therein vested in the Minister of Finance.
Net profits were reserved for the State Treasury and municipalities which held shares. The Supreme Court denied immunity, and
the distinct legal personality of the corporation was given effect.
The principle of the Ulen case has been generally followed in
the United States. There have been instances, though, in which
U.S. courts have granted sovereign immunity to state trading
corporations. In one because the court found the primary purpose of the corporation to be that of supplying oil to the British
Navy. 60 In this case it will be noted that the court used the
"objects" test as the basis for its decision. As far as state trading
corporations are concerned, the principle generally applied by
U.S. courts is clearly more in accordance with justice and contemporary economic reality than that applied in the United
61
Kingdom.
In France, Germany and Italy it seems that state trading
agencies are not now entitled to immunity from jurisdiction
although there was fluctuation in France early in this century
on sovereign immunity. Soviet state trading agencies have not
enjoyed immunity in the French courts. 62 In Italy, courts have
56 For a recent case on sovereign immunity, see Swiss-Israel Bank v.
Salta Times, April 14th, 1972, at 14, col. 8. In this case McKenna J.
declined to set aside a writ against an Argentine bank which was not
a department of state, but an independent corporation carrying on a
banking business free of government control; by Article 2 the Organic

Law of the Provincial Bank of Salta, it was stated to be autarchic.

Bank of United States v. Planter's Bank, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824).
See S. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 4, at 120-23.
See In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280, 291 (1952).
60 24 N.Y.S. 2d 201 (1940).
57
58
59
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For recent cases concerning state trading corporations in which sovereign
immunity was not granted by the courts, see Pan American Tankships
Corp. v. Republic of Viet Nam, 296 F. Supp. 361 (D.C.N.Y. 1969);
Amkor Corp. vi Bank of Korea 298 F. Supp. 143 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).

62

See the cases cited in Lauterpacht's article, supra note 1, at 260-61.
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consistently denied sovereign immunity to state foreign agencies engaging in trading activities,'63 and it seems that the German courts now take a similar position.
The Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity and the Concept of the
Abuse of Rights
As mentioned previously, the House of Lords and the legislature both have the power to modify the application of the
doctrine of sovereign immunity without violating the accepted
principles of international customary law. 4 Some claims of
sovereign immunity constitute an abuse of rights or liberties.
The "right" to plead sovereign immunity in the forum of a
territorial state is a liberty 6 5 granted by a state to the foreign
state or state trading agency. Although it does not seem to have
been contended previously, 0 under certain circumstances the
plea of sovereign immunity might be considered to be abusive
by international law. Fitzmaurice has pointed out that the
exercise of a liberty by a state may be abusive.0 7 This was also
pointed out by the International Court of Justice in the Norwegian Fisheries Case.0 8 There the majority opinion held that
although Norway, by reason of territorial title and acquiescence
by other states, or as a result of the unique character of her
coast, might delimit her territorial waters by long straight base
lines, they must follow the general direction of the coast. And,
though Norway had some freedom in fixing them, the choice of
the base lines could not show manifest abuse. 9
Where a state has agreed to arbitration, or to accepting the
jurisdiction of the courts,70 and then pleads sovereign immunity,
63 S. SUCHARITKUL, supra note 4, at 141; see also Floridi v. Soveportrfilm,

Nov. 15, 1951, Annali X(1954), p. 115.
64 It would be desirable to regulate the whole matter by an international
convention, but difficult to achieve.
65 It is analytically a liberty, as international law does not prevent it from
being granted, and dces not define its extent.
66 No mention appears in such important texts which are concerned with,
or mention, the concept of abuse of rights as the Hague Lectures of
Politics (H.R., 1925, vol. I Pp. 5, 77-109); STOWELL'S INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1931); FITZMAURICE's HAGUE LECIUREs OF 1957 (H.R. 1957, vol. 2, pp.
5-54); ALVAREZ, DROIT INTERNATIONAL NOUVEAU (1958); and H. LAuTERPACHT, FUNCTION OF LAW IN THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY, Ch. 14.
67 Fitzmaurice, supra, note 9 at 53.
68 See Norwegian Fisheries Case, [1951] I.C.J. 116.
9 Id. at 412. One of the most interesting judgments in the I.C.J. concerning the abuse of rights is by Judge Alvarez. See also Second Admission Case, [1950] I.C.J. 15.
70 In Kohan v. Pakistan Federation [1951] 2 K.B. 1003, this was held not

to constitute a submission to the jurisdiction. The requirements for
submission to the jurisdiction are very strict in English law.
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the principle of abuse of rights should be applicable.7 1 It seems
a fortiori, in circumstances analogous with those in Duff Development Co. v. Kalantan Government 7 2 that the action of the
foreign state which had resulted in an injury to a national of
the territorial state could be treated as an abuse of rights. One
might envisage other circumstances in which the plea of sovereign immunity could be treated as abusive.
It might be that a territorial state accepting the principle
of absolute immunity in state trading, and a foreign sovereign
pleading sovereign immunity, accepts the jurisdiction of the
International Court of Justice, although this is by no means
certain. The state may have accepted the jurisdiction subject
to many reservations 7 3 including the doubtfully effective automatic reservation, adopted by the United States in the Connally
amendment. It will, however, be remembered that the Optional
Clause of the Statute of the International Court provides for jurisdiction in legal disputes concerning questions of international
law. These questions may certainly involve the determination of
whether a state has comitted an abuse of rights and injured a
foreign national. The novelty of the claim would, of course,
be no bar to its consideration by the International Court, but
few states have accepted its jurisdiction, and they have made
many reservations thereto.
Abuse of Rights and Public Opinion
As the preceding observations have shown, the International Court of Justice h,,s approached the issue of whether a
state, by pleading sovereign immunity in a matter of international trade is committing an abuse of sovereign power. However, it is also necessary to devise a procedure applicable to the
frequent cases in which the International Court has no jurisdiction.
Here we are on terra nova. However, this should not deter
us. A fair and just procedure should be adopted in the interest
of creating a healthy climate for investment by countries with
It is thought that the concept of abuse of rights in international law
has a wider connotation than it has according to the German Civil Code,
intention to harm, (See RGZ
Art. 226, where there must be a deliberate
69/380; RGZ 138/373; J.W. 1936, p.330 8 ) and no other object. Some
cases in French company law have circumscribed the doctrine in a
like way.
72 [1924] A.C. 797. In that case there was an arbitration clause in a contract
with a foreign sovereign, and an award was made in pursuance thereof.
The foreign sovereign unsuccessfully applied to have the award set aside,
and upon this application being refused, the Kelantan government successfully pleaded sovereign immunity, which they had not raised earlier.
73 See Waldock, [1955-56] BRIT. Y.B. INT'L. 244.
71
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industrial know-how which are prepared to transfer their technological knowledge to developing countries. It is thought that,
where a state tries to avoid its contractual obligations by abusing the plea of sovereign immunity, a procedure consisting of
two stages should be adopted.
The first stage would be an authoritative ascertainment
that an abuse of the plea of immunity has occurred. The complaining private corporation or state 74 should address itself to
an international jurist of undoubted world reputation. It must
be pointed out that, although the proposed procedure would be
an ex parte one, the state which wishes to plead sovereign
immunity would be allowed to appear during the hearing of
the case to request the rejection of the application upon certain
defined grounds. There would seem to be nothing to prevent a
member or ex-member of the International Law Commission
from assuming such a function. The position of present members
of the International Court of Justice might be more doubtful;
the express provisions of Art. 17 of the Statute of the Court
would not appear to prevent the assumption of such a role by
a member of the Court, and neither would the rules pursuant
to the article in 1949. 7 5 When, however, a decision of a member
of the I.C.J. may be the subject of an appeal to the Court, the
judge must, according to the 1949 rules, decline jurisdiction.
These rules apply only if a state accepts the jurisdiction of the
I.C.J.
In addition to members or ex-members of the International
Law Commission and the International Court, there are eminent
jurists of world repute in the field of public international law
prepared to accept jurisdiction. It would obviously be better,
in cases of the kind envisaged to nominate a "neutral" jurist,
one who is not a national of either state concerned in the dispute. The giving of an opinion by a jurist in circumstances such
as these is clearly not a violation of the fundamental principle
of international law contained in Art. 2(7) of the Charter of
the United Nations, namely, the prohibition of intervention in
matters which are essentially within domestic jurisdiction. The
presence of an abuse of an international right, such as the plea
of immunity, removes the matter from domestic jurisdiction.
-14 The competence of the state is made clear by the Mavrommatis Conces-

sions Case, [1924] P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 2, at 12. It is now argued correctly
by many that international corporations have likewise some degree of
capacity in public international law.
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For these rules, see [1953-54) Y.B.I.C.J. 96.
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Also, the giving of such an opinion can scarcely be construed
as "intervention."
In the second stage, when the international jurist has come
to the conclusion that the defaulting state has committed an
act of abuse in its plea of immunity, the question of the consequences of these findings arises. Obviously a coercion of the
defaulting state or interference with its internal sovereignty is
not involved. The findings of the jurist would be passed on to
the world at large, and world-wide publicity would be given
them thus making it known that a prima facie case of abuse
of the plea of immunity has been established against the defaulting state. The findings should also be communicated to international financial circles, such as the World Bank and its
related institutions. It will then be left to these financial instituions to decide whether to continue providing financial support
to the defaulting state.
In this connection, reference should be made to the statement of President Nixon of January 19, 1972, in which he reaffirmed the long-standing policy of the United States in these
matters. President Nixon pointed out that countries which expropriate often fail to attain their own investment goals. He
stated that under international law the United States has a
right to expect that takings of American private property will
be non-discriminatory, for a public purpose, and that prompt;
adequate and effective compensation will be paid. He stated
that, in face of expropriations which are contrary to international law, the United States would withhold its support for
loans to the countries concerned in multilateral investment
77
banks.7 6 In 1972, the U.S. Congress enacted three statutes
requiring U.S. representatives in the World Bank and related
agencies to vote against loans where property owned by U.S.
citizens or U.S. controlled business associations has been nationalized, expropriated or seized, or where contracts or agreements with U.S. citizens or U.S. controlled business associations
have been repudiated or nullified, or where discriminatory
taxes, restrictive maintenance, operational conditions, or other
measures are imposed which have the effect of nationalization,
expropriation, or otherwise seizing ownership or control of
property so owned, and where no determination is made by
the President that an arrangement for prompt, adequate and
76 An exception was made in this statement for humanitarian assistance.
For an estimate of the likely success of Mr. Nixon's policy, see Financial Times, Jan. 20, 1972, at 5, col. 2.
77 Public Laws 92-245, 92-246, and 92-247 of March 10, 1972.
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effective compensation has been made; or where the parties
have submitted the matter to arbitration under the rules of
the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes;18 or
where negotiations are taking place in good faith with the object
of providing prompt, adequate and effective compensation in
accordance with the applicable principles of international law."0
It is clear that, by reason of the weighted voting system in the
World Bank and the International Development Association, a
bloc of developed states could prevent a loan to a developing
country which expropriated the property of a national of one
of the developed states.
As President Nixon pointed out in his statement, the Department of State has set up a special office for the purpose
of following expropriation cases.8 0 The emphasis made by the
President in his statement on the usefulness of arbitration in
the settlement of investment disputes is of great interest. Mr.
Nixon also stated that the U.S. government would cooperate
with the international financial institutions to achieve a mutually beneficial atmosphere for investment. Such cooperation
would include the encouragement of less developed states which
have not adhered to the 1966 Convention for the Settlement of
Investment Disputes to do so, and it would also include the
use of measures such as the legislation already mentioned. In
this context, it is noteworthy that the Bank and the International Development Association have a long-standing policy
of not lending to countries which have expropriated foreign
investments and which have failed to evidence progress toward
satisfactory settlement of the matter.8 '
Once it is recognized that the Nixon Statement of 1972
is founded on the general principle of international law that
an abuse of the right of sovereignty in international trade,
although not leading to sanctions, should be taken note of by
international public opinion, a solution of a problem which has
long impeded the development of a healthy climate for international business and investment is in sight. As was pointed
out at the beginning of this article, the old concept of unrestricted sovereignty has no room in the international trade relations of the modern world. In international trade relations,
See 4 INT'L LEGAL MAT. 524 (1965).
The OECD has formulated principles with regard to expropriation.
0 See 7 INT'L LEGAL MAT 117 (1968).
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8

81 Note in this context the British opposition to a loan to Tanzania in the

IDA, which took place because of a Tanzanian expropriation without
compensation; see Financial Times, Jan. 31, 1972, at 5, col. 7.
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states should be treated in the same manner as ordinary businessmen, and a state that tries to avoid its ordinary commercial
obligations by pleading immunity should be regarded in public
opinion the same as a businesman who tries to avoid the rules
of fair business practices.

